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CONTRACT LAW
I. RIGHT TO SET-OFF OF INTERIM INTEREST IN SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE ACTION CLARIFIED
In Windham v. Honeycutt1 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals clarified South Carolina law regarding the set-off of in-
terim interest on the purchase price of property against the fair
rental value of the property pursuant to a specific performance
decree. In addition, the court indirectly provided guidance about
what is required for an appellate court's review of an award of
special damages.
In August 1979 Windham entered into a written contract
with Honeycutt in which Honeycutt agreed to sell Windham
thirty acres of land for $115,000 with a down payment of
$60,000.2 Honeycutt later refused to convey the property, and
Windham obtained a decree from the court for specific perform-
ance of the contract. The supreme court affirmed the specific
performance decree of the trial court and remanded for a hear-
ing-to determine the amount of special damages.3
At the damages hearing a special referee recommended that
Windham receive the rental value of the land during the period
of delay, reimbursement for the costs he incurred in boarding
his horses and dogs during this period, and the monetary loss he
suffered as a result of being forced to sell his horses before the
conveyance for less than fair market value.4 The referee also rec-
ommended that the court reject Honeycutt's request for the set-
off and dismiss his counterclaim.5 The trial court adopted the
recommendations of the referee and Honeycutt appealed.
Honeycutt asserted that the trial judge should have sub-
tracted the interest that could have been earned on the purchase
price during the interim from the fair rental value of the prop-
erty awarded to Windham. The court of appeals agreed and fol-
1. 290 S.C. 60, 348 S.E.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1986).
2. Id. at 62, 348 S.E.2d at 186.
3. Windham v. Honeycutt, 279 S.C. 109, 302 S.E.2d 856 (1983).
4. 290 S.C. at 62, 348 S.E.2d at 186.
5. Id.
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lowed the majority rule:
An award of fair rental value. . . cannot be correctly char-
acterized as special damages; rather, the award is in the nature
of an accounting, by which a court of equity seeks to place the
parties in the same position as if the conveyance had been
made when due. To achieve this, the court will award the fair
rental value of the property to ihe purchaser on the one hand
and, on the other, interest on the unpaid purchase price to the
vendor. One cannot be awarded without the other. "The fruits
of possession and the interest are mutually exclusive-there is
no right upon the part of either [the purchaser or the vendor]
to have both."'8
Windham, while acknowledging this general rule,7 relied on
apparently misleading dicta in Shannon v. Freeman' and Farr v.
Sprouse' to argue that the court should not award interest on
the purchase price when the vendor intentionally delays the per-
formance of a sales contract.10 The court of appeals ignored
6. Id. at 62-63, 348 S.E.2d at 186 (citations omitted) (brackets in original) (quoting
Bembridge v. Miller, 235 Or. 396, 408, 385 P.2d 172, 178 (1963)).
7. Windham's brief provided the following overview of the issue in South Carolina:
[I]t is admitted that the general rule of offsetting the interest of the purchase
price against the rents and profits derived from the land in a suit in equity
involving specific performance has been followed in South Carolina. In the
early case of Rutledge v. Smith, 6 S.C. Equ. [sic] (1 McCord. Eq.) 399 (1826),
the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled the chancellor's holding that a
purchaser who receives rents and profits after the vendor has refused to fulfill
the contract of sale is not required to setoff the interest on the purchase price.
The Court ruled that a purchaser who takes possession and remains in the
uninterrupted enjoyment of the land, or who receives the rents and profits
must pay interest.
Brief of Respondent at 3.
8. 117 S.C. 480, 109 S.E. 406 (1921).
9. 133 S.C. 93, 130 S.E. 210 (1925).
10. In Farr v. Sprouse the defendant purchaser bought a two-acre parcel of land
and took possession. The land, however, was subject to a mortgage, and before the plain-
tiff could secure a release of the parcel to give the title to the defendant, the plaintiff
arranged to have his land sold at public auction. At the auction the defendant purchased
a 52.8 acre tract including the two acres that he had contracted to purchase. The trial
court found that the defendant still was bound to pay for the two acres in accord with
the original contract. On appeal, however, the court wrote that "[t]he defendant, not
being able to get title to the 2 acres of land, through no fault on his part, should not be
charged with interest on the purchase price." 133 S.C. at 98, 130 S.E. at 211.
In Shannon v. Freeman the rents and profits were not an issue. The court, however,
affirmed and reprinted the master's holding. The court stated as follows:
Should the plaintiff be required to account to the defendants for interest? This
question was not argued before the Master, but the Master is of the opinion
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss1/6
1987] CONTRACT LAW
these confusing precedents"1 and simply adopted the general
rule which provides as follows:
An offset for interim interest on the purchase price will be al-
lowed even where the vendor was at fault in delaying the con-
veyance; however, to prevent the vendor from profiting by her
wrong doing, the offset will be limited in that the vendor can-
not recover any excess of interest over rents and profits.
12
In avoiding a prolonged discussion of old, confusing South Caro-
lina cases, the court of appeals established that South Carolina
follows the majority rule. 13
that the purchaser is not liable for interest. The Master finds that the delay in
the performance has been due to the default of the defendants; that the de-
fendant, Mrs. Freeman, as trustee for herself and the other defendants, has
remained in possession of the land, refusing to deliver possession to plaintiff,
and retaining for herself and the other defendants such benefits or profits as go
with the possession of this land. As the land is vacant, it may be, and very
probably is, the case that there has been no income therefrom. But of this
defendants cannot complain. Such benefit, if any, as grows out of possession of
this land they have retained over the protest of plaintiff. Where the delay in
performance is imputable to the vendor, he is not entitled to interest.
117 S.C. at 492, 109 S.E. at 410.
11. The appellant in her brief stated, "In a jurisprudence as rich as South Caro-
lina's, where a topic as common as interim interest has been the subject of reported
litigation since 1797, inevitably some troublesome dicta will find their way into the re-
ports and the digests. The subject at bar is no exception." Brief of Appellant at 14. The
appellant's brief also noted and analyzed the following facts of Shannon:
Freeman agreed to sell a lot in the City of Greenville to Shannon. Freeman
failed to perform. Shannon sought specific performance. The vendor remained
in possession during the litigation. Since the vendor was in default, he sought
no affirmative recovery of interim interest .... Since the land was vacant and
unproductive, the purchaser did not seek interim rents and profits. Although
the vendor in default understandably sought no affirmative recovery of inter-
est, the master in equity took it upon himself to declare that "[w]here the
delay in performance is imputable to the vendor, he is not entitled to interest."
It is true, of course, that the vendor in default is not entitled to an affirmative
recovery, even where the interest exceeds the rents and profits, and this is
what the master must have meant to say.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The appellant asserted that because Farr was a case at law, and not for an account-
ing after specific performance, the present appeal did not present an opportunity to de-
cide whether the dictum in Farr, given the unique facts of Farr, was right or wrong. Id.
at 17-18.
12. 290 S.C. at 63, 348 S.E.2d at 186. Another exception to awarding interim interest
is that interest is not awarded when the purchaser gathers the money, notifies the vendor
that the money is idle and subject to his command, and the purchaser thereafter earns
nothing from the fund. Rutledge v. Smith, 6 S.C. Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 399 (1826).
13. See Annotation, Specific Performance: Compensation or Damages Awarded
3
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Although Honeycutt succeeded in obtaining an offset of the
interest, the court did not rule on Honeycutt's other two argu-
ments. Honeycutt argued that she should be entitled to recover
both the costs of repairs, maintenance, and improvements that
she made on the property, and the amount of taxes and insur-
ance that she paid during the period in which closing was
delayed. 14 The court, noting a split of authority,15 did not decide
these issues because the record was insufficient to allow an intel-
ligent review. 16
Honeycutt also argued that the trial judge erred in awarding
special damages to Windham for expenses incurred in boarding
his dogs and horses during the delay, and for the loss incurred in
the sale of the horses. She claimed that she did not know at the
time she entered into the contract that Windham was planning
to keep dogs and horses on the land, or that he would be forced
to sell his horses if closing were delayed. 7 The court recognized
the general rule that "in addition to ordering specific perform-
ance, a court may award special damages resulting from a re-
fusal to convey or delay in conveying real property according to
the terms of the contract." 8 The court defined special damages
as "those that may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties, at the time of contracting, as the
probable result of a breach."'19 The court, however, did not pur-
sue the matter further because the question was not properly
before the court.2 0
Augustus M. Dixon
Purchaser for Delay in Conveyance of Land, 7 A.L.R.2D 1204 (1949).
14. 290 S.C. at 63, 348 S.E.2d at 187.
15. Annot., supra note 13, at 1227-29.
16. The court stated, "The burden is on the appellant to furnish a sufficient record
on appeal from which this court can make an intelligent review .... This court will not
consider facts that do not appear in the transcript of record." 290 S.C. at 63-64, 348
S.E.2d at 187 (citations omitted).
17. 290 S.C. at 64, 348 S.E.2d at 187.
18. Id. (citations omitted).
19. Id.
20. The court wrote,
[Tihe exceptions to the special referee's report are based solely on grounds
that there was no evidence that such damages were incurred. As far as the
record before us shows, the trial judge never considered whether the award of
special damages was anticipated by the parties; therefore, this issue is first
raised on appeal. It is well settled that a question not presented before or
passed upon by the special referee or trial judge is not properly before this
court,
[Vol. 39
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II. REQUIREMENTS FOR WAIVER OF TIME PERIOD IN OPTION
CONTRACT TO PURCHASE LAND CLARIFIED
Generally, in contract law, an obligor can waive a condition
of a contract or option if the condition is not "a material part of
the agreed exchange."21 While this general rule previously may
have existed by implication in South Carolina contract law, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals now has explicitly recognized
the rule. The court of appeals held in Edwards v. Rouse22 that
an optionor23 may waive his right to require exercise of an op-
tion within the time period stipulated in the contract.
Edwards concerned a dispute over a real estate option con-
tract. Vanderhorst (optionor) granted a thirty day option to
Liebenroud to purchase a tract of land. The day after the parties
executed the option contract, Liebenroud assigned the rights to
the option to Edwards. One day after the option expired, Ed-
wards' attorney sent a letter to the optionor purporting to exer-
cise the option. The optionor later met with Edwards' attorney
several times and assisted in settling the title to the land.
Shortly after assisting in settling the title, but before the con-
tract was performed, the optionor died. After the optionor died,
the optionor's heirs continued to assist the attorneys with the
title examination. Later, the heirs informed Edwards' attorney
that they did not wish to sell the land and refused to honor the
contract. The heirs argued that Edwards failed to exercise the
option before it expired. Edwards sued for specific performance
of the contract.The master in equity, the circuit court, and the
court of appeals refused to recognize the lapse of the option as a
bar to specific performance. Instead, all three bodies held that
the optionor had waived his right to strict compliance with the
time requirement and that a valid contract existed between
Vanderhorst and Edwards. Thus, the heirs were bound by that
contract.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84(1)(a) (1981).
22. 290 S.C. 449, 351 S.E.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1986).
23. An "optionor" is the grantor in an option contract. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1711 (2d. ed. 1936).
1987]
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The general rule concerning waiver of a time restriction in
an option is as follows: "[A]n optionor may, expressly or by vol-
untary acts of conduct, waive a requirement of a contract of op-
tion to purchase, that exercise of the option shall be made
within a limited time, thereby excusing, under the general prin-
ciples of waiver, a delay of the optionee in that regard. 2 4 Al-
though South Carolina courts traditionally have required strict
compliance with time limitations in option contracts, Edwards
was the first case which allowed the court to address the waiver
of a time requirement in an option contract.
25
Dargan v. Page26 illustrates South Carolina law concerning
the timeliness of the exercise of an option. Dargan involved an
option to purchase timber from a tract of land. The option had
to be exercised within thirty days of the date on which it was
granted. The optionee, after failing to exercise the option within
the stated limit, sued for specific performance. The supreme
court held that "[tihe time element expressed in [an option]
must be strictly complied 'with, or relief by way of specific per-
formance will be denied. '2 7 Dargan differs from Edwards in one
material respect: Dargan contained no evidence of a waiver of
the time requirement. The testimony in Dargan revealed that
the optionor "considered that the option had expired and that
he was not bound thereby. ' 2 Edwards, however, contained evi-
dence of waiver on the part of the optionor. In Edwards the
master in equity and the circuit court found that the optionor's
conduct constituted a waiver of his right to insist on exercise of
the option within the thirty day period.29 The court of appeals
affirmed this finding.30 The optionor demonstrated his belief
that the time restriction in the option was not material and,
thus, could be waived.
Edwards modified but did not overrule Dargan. The law in
South Carolina still requires strict compliance with the terms of
an option. The rule is modified, however, in cases when the op-
24. 17 Ar.i. Jun. 2D Contracts § 61 (1964).
25. See Cotter v. James L. Tapp Co., 267 S.C. 647, 657, 230 S.E.2d 715, 720 (1976)
(conduct not sufficient to constitute a waiver).
26. 222 S.C. 520, 72 S.E.2d 705 (1952).
27. Id. at 526, 73 S.E.2d at 708.
28. Id. at 531, 73 S.E.2d at 710.
29. 290 S.C. at 450-51, 351 S.E.2d at 175.
30. Id. at 452, 351 S.E.2d at 177.
[Vol. 39
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tionor expresses a clear desire to waive strict compliance with a
term. If there is evidence of waiver, the courts are likely to rec-
ognize the parties' desire to change the terms of the option. If
there is no evidence of waiver, Dargan will still apply and strict
compliance to the terms of the option will be required.
Peter Mathews Thomas
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